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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. ] 
HANK GALETKA, ] 
Warden of the Utah ] 
State Prison, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) Case No. 20051029-SC 
) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
) ON CERTIFICATION OF 
> QUESTION OF LAW 
> CAPITAL CASE 
This case is before this Court solely on a certification of state law issue from the 
federal court. The question to be addressed is: "If Mr. Gardner had raised the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim at issue in Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, 94 P.3d 263, in 
State court in a successive Petition in 1990, would the petition have been procedurally 
barred?" 
Respondent first attempts to distort the issue before the court by arguing that there 
was no good cause to excuse "his fourteen year delay in rasing the present ineffective 
assistance claim." (Respondent's Brief, pp. 12, 17-18 (emphasis added).) The certified 
question asks this Court to examine the procedural default issue assuming the claim had 
been raised in 1990. Any reference or argument about a "fourteen year delay" should be 
ignored as beyond the certified question. 
1 
Respondent then expends much effort to argue that there is either no merit to the 
claim or that Petitioner has made different arguments about why the claim should be 
granted on its merits. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-9, 16-17.) Neither of these arguments 
are relevant to a determination of the certified question which asks about the application of 
the procedural default doctrine in 1990, not the merits of the claim. Indeed, Respondent 
ignores his prior arguments in the District Court in this case that it is not proper to look at 
the merits of the claim until the procedural default issue is resolved. (See, R. 287, 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 8.)1 
Respondent finally reaches the question before this Court - whether Petitioner 
meets the standards set out in Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989). Respondent 
first argues that the issue presented does not meet the fundamental fairness prong and then 
argues that the overlooked in good faith prong does not apply. Respondent's argument on 
each Hurst factor must be rejected, just as the District Court rejected them.2 (R. 363-
364.) 
Similarly, Respondent does not address the discretion of a trial court to dismiss a 
claim on the merits without requiring a response from the State. (See, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 65B(c) and Appellant's Brief, p. 9, n. 3). Had the trial court done so, this 
would have been a decision on the merits not a dismissal based upon a procedural default. 
Such a dismissal was not made in this case and cannot be done here where the sole issue 
before the court is the certification of a state law question on procedural default. 
2On appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition, an appellate court reviews 
the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and its factual findings for clear error. 
Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61,1 8, 52 P.3d, 1168. 
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1. The Fundamental Fairness Factor 
Respondent asserts that the claim does not involve an issue of fundamental fairness 
because the jury instruction issue is not "directly" challenged but is the underlying basis for 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Respondent's Brief, p. 14.) This Court must 
reject this argument. 
First, Respondent never raised this novel argument regarding procedural default in 
the District Court or before this Court in the prior appeal. It is therefore not appropriate to 
permit this new argument on the resolution of a certification of a state law question, 
especially when Respondent cites to no case law existing in 1990 to support his new 
position about the "indirect" nature of the claim. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 13-14.) 
Second, the underlying facts alleged in the petition demonstrate that trial counsel 
requested the proper instruction but the trial court gave an improper instruction. The claim 
alleged that had Petitioner's appellate counsel raised this issue of the improper instruction 
on the critical element of the offense, relief would have been granted. The claim thus goes 
immediately to an issue of fundamental fairness - proper instructions in a capital case. 
This Court does not have to determine that all ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
automatically meet the Hurst "fundamental fairness" factor to rule, as the District Court 
did, that the issues presented here, if meritorious, raise a concern about the fairness of the 
trial proceedings. 
Respondent cites two cases in support of his argument that all ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims are not covered by the Hurst decision: Monson v. State, 953 P.2d 73 
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(Utah 1998) and Hurst v. Cook, supra. (Respondent's Brief, p. 14.) Neither is controlling 
on the issue now before this Court. In Monson, the defendant entered a guilty plea and was 
sentenced to five years to life in 1985. He filed no appeal of his conviction or sentence. In 
1993, he filed a petition seeking relief from the Utah Board of Pardons5 1992 decision 
regarding his parole. The district court denied that petition, and while his appeal of that 
petition was pending, Monson, pro se, filed a new petition in 1995. The second petition 
raised three claims: 1) the trial court failed to establish a factual basis for the plea; 2) his 
plea was unknowing because he did not understand the elements of the charge; and 3) his 
trial counsel was ineffective. 
This Court affirmed the dismissal of the second petition as successive. Monson 
provided no argument of why he would fall under any of the Hurst factors. This Court 
found that "Monson has offered no justification as to why he did not raise his second 
petition claims in his first petition. Although Monson asserts that the judge stayed at his 
December 22, 1994 hearing that the judge believed Monson's trial counsel did not render 
effective assistance, there is no evidence in the record to support this claim." Id at p. 75 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, Monson has no bearing on Respondent's argument that ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims will be automatically barred on a successive petition. In fact, Monson 
infers that the defendant might have been able to meet one of the Hurst factors if he had 
presented evidence establishing those factors in the district court. In contrast, Petitioner 
here provided affidavits and evidence in support of his contention that he fell under two of 
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the Hurst factors; indeed, Respondent has conceded in the prior appeal that there is no 
dispute about the relevant facts before the district court. (Respondent's Brief in Case No. 
20010875-SC,p.29.) 
Nor does Hurst itself establish any such rule about an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. As Respondent acknowledges, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
in Hurst was procedurally defaulted because it had been raised and decided in the first 
petition. This is a separate and distinct basis for dismissal of a successive petition from the 
one at issue here - the failure to raise the issue in the first petition. 
This Court has long held that an incorrect jury instruction on a critical element of 
the offense is a matter of fundamental fairness, one that may even require automatic 
reversal. "An accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged is 
essential, and the failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." State v. Laine, 618 
P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980); see also, State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981). As the 
District Court held, the claim goes to an error in the jury instruction which, if meritorious, 
may lead to reversal of the conviction and the resulting death sentence. 
Finally, Respondent argues that this case is not distinguishable from Andrews v. 
Shulsen, 113 P.2d 832 (Utah 1988) which involved the giving of a lesser included second 
degree murder charge. While this Court in Andrews held that a successive petition was not 
permitted, there was no detailed discussion of the factors argued and examined.3 There 
3This Court did not establish a list of potential factors until Hurst was decided in 
1989, a year after Andrews. 
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was discussion about the evolving law on the giving of a lesser included offense as a reason 
for not raising this claim before. The facts relating to the claim of failure to give such a 
lesser instruction are complex. Andrews was tried jointly with co-defendants Keith 
Roberts and Pierre Dale Selby, also know as Dale. S. Pierre. Roberts was convicted only of 
robbery, while Andrews and Pierre were convicted of murder and sentenced to death. 
Pierre, however, did request a lesser instruction which was denied. This Court upheld the 
trial court's denial of the instruction in Pierre's appeal. See, State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 
1338 (Utah 1977). At his trial in 1974, Andrews did not request a lesser included 
instruction; in fact at that time, the federal constitution did not require such an instruction 
in a capital case. That right was established by the United States Supreme Court six years 
later in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); nor has that rule been made retroactive to 
cases final before the decision in Beck. Moreover, Beck did not require that a state court 
automatically give a lesser included instruction in each and every capital case; the Supreme 
Court held that a lesser included instruction is required only where the evidence would have 
supported such a verdict, and the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama statute which 
absolutely precluded the giving of a lesser included instruction in every capital case. 
Moreover, a defendant may waive his right to the giving of the lesser included instruction in 
a capital case. See, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456-457 (1984). 
In contrast, courts have long held that an erroneous instruction of an element of the 
offense is an error of fundamental magnitude. There can be no argument that the law 
concerning this issue was "evolving" in 1990. 
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Finally, Andrews had previously filed petitions for post-conviction relief in 1978 
and again in 1983. Thus, the petition resolved in the case relied upon by Respondent was 
the third post-conviction petition, including one filed three years after Beck was decided. 
Moreover, this Court in the companion case of the co-defendant had already rejected the 
request for a lesser instruction as not being based upon the evidence presented. See, State 
v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977). 
2. The "Overlooked in Good Faith with No Intent to Abuse or Delay the Writ" Factor 
Respondent ignores the case law cited by this Court in Hurst to establish the 
contours of the fifth factor - a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or 
abuse the writ. Respondent thus does not mention the notion of "an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right" on which this Hurst factor was based. Respondent argues 
that this would allow a petitioner to hold back a claim "for tactical purposes." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-19.) However, this is not the same as "overlooking a claim in 
good faith." 
As the District Court found, the only evidence presented was that the claim was 
simply overlooked with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. Respondent presented no 
evidence that Petitioner or his attorneys withheld this claim "for tactical purposes." While 
Respondent may not like the language of Hurst and Potts v. Zants, 638 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 
1981), this Court cannot overrule Hurst in this proceeding; the only certified question is 
how Hurst was being applied in 1990, not whether this Court should continue to apply 
Hurst's fifth factor in 2006. 
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Next, Respondent attempts to expand the plain reading of Hurst which states that 
"Hurst's raising of the issue now indicates no intent to delay or abuse the writ." Hurst v. 
Cook, 111 P.2d at 1038. Respondent argues that the intent to abuse is used "only as a 
screening device," (Respondent's Brief p. 19), inferring that if the underlying claim did not 
fall within an additional Hurst factor, this Court would not have reached the merits of 
Hurst's claim. Of course, this Court in Hurst held that good cause could be shown by any 
of the five factors and used the disjunctive "or" in listing the factors.4 Hurst v. Cook, 111 
P.2d at 1037. No case has held that the good faith factor, standing by itself, is not 
sufficient to permit the court to review the merits of a successive petition.5 Respondent's 
argument to the contrary must be rejected as an attempt to redefine the Hurst factors, 
rather than applying them to this case, as the District Court did. 
Respondent's reliance on Tilllman v. State, 2005 UT 56, 128 P.3d 1123, is 
similarly unavailing.6 While the issue of the prosecution's failure to disclose the evidence 
4Nor is the Hurst list exhaustive. Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 
1990). 
Respondent also argues that the claim at issue in Hurst was itself more significant 
than the claim presented here. However, once this Court addressed the merits of Hurst's 
claim, it was quickly rejected. Hurst had entered a plea to a reduced charge and received 
the benefit of his plea bargain as the more serious charges were dismissed. In a mere two 
paragraphs, this Court resolved the merits of the claim against Hurst - he got precisely 
what he bargained for when he entered his guilty plea. 
Respondent's reliance on three other cases must also be rejected. (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 22.) Johns v. Shulsen, 784 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1989) and Monson v. State, 953 
P.2d 73 (Utah 1998) are pro se cases in which the petitioner made absolutely no attempt to 
carry his burden of meeting any of the Hurst factors. In Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1990), the petitioner, although represented by counsel, made no effort to show why 
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was discussed, this Court held that under the facts presented in the district court Tillman 
had met the "overlooked in good faith" factor. This Court did not use this factor only as a 
"screening device" to then reach another Hurst factor. 
Moreover, Tillman reaffirmed this Court's willingness to re-examine cases where 
there may have been an injustice. Id. at f 21. Here, the District Court properly applied 
these standards and determined that there were valid reasons to reach the merits of the 
claim. Whatever the result of an examination of those merits might be, the District Court's 
application of the Hurst factors was correct, and this Court should resolve the certified 
question in a similar manner. Had the claim been raised in a 1990 successive petition, the 
merits of the claim would have been addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those set out in the opening brief, it is respectfully 
requested that this Court answer the certified question of state law by ruling that the claim 
would not have been procedurally defaulted had it been raised in a 1990 successive petition. 
Dated: July 10, 2006. 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
he had not pursued the lack of notice issue at the revocation hearing or on his first petition. 
All three cases are related primarily to revocation hearings or hearings before the Board of 
Pardons, and none involve an issue such as the incorrect jury instruction in a capital case. 
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